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Abstract
Costs associated with traffic externalities such as congestion, air pollution, noise, safety, etcetera are
becoming “unbearable”. The Braess paradox shows that combating congestion by adding infrastruc-
ture may not improve traffic conditions, and geographical and/or financial constraints may not allow5
infrastructure expansion. Road pricing presents an alternative to combat the mentioned externalities.
The traditional way of road pricing, namely; congestion charging, may create negative benefits for the
society and stakeholders, thus, defeating its main purpose (increasing transportation efficiency and so-
cial welfare). We study a road pricing that encompasses all the mentioned externalities. A meanwhile
standard approach to deal with conflicting objectives (externalities) are models from Multi-objective10
Optimization. This approach assumes that there is one leader stakeholder/decision-maker. But then,
if more than one stakeholder participates in the road pricing, the concept of Nash equilibrium (NE)
from economics may constitute an alternative model. Using game theoretic approach, we study and
extend the single authority road pricing scheme (Stackelberg game) to a pricing scheme with multiple
authorities/regions (with likely contradicting objectives). Our model includes users interests in the up-15
per level - giving a promising model that deals with user acceptability of road pricing. We investigate
the existence of NE among actors and prove that no pure NE exists in general. Then again, NE may
exist under special conditions. Since NE may not exist, and since competition may deteriorate the
social welfare, we further design a mechanism that simultaneously induces a pure NE and cooperative
behaviour among actors, thus, yielding optimal tolls for the system.20
1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past years, vehicle ownership has increased tremendously. It has been realized that the social
cost of owning and driving a vehicle does not only include the purchase, fuel, and maintenance fees, but
also the cost of man hour loss to congestion and road maintenance, costs of health issues resulting from
accidents, exposure to poisonous compounds from exhaust pipes, and high noise level from vehicles. So,25
to optimize the traffic flow requires a model that optimizes more than one objective which may be in
conflict with each other. The model should also consider the user benefit. Optimization of more than
one traffic externality is not a novel idea. Road pricing that simultaneously treat time losses, increased
fuel consumption, and emission is discussed in [1, 2]. Traffic congestion, air pollution and accident
externalities are considered in [3]. Single- and bi-criteria Pareto optimization that deal with users with30
different values of time and two objectives (time and money) were studied in [4, 5, 6]. Road damage
externality is incorporated in the road pricing models of [7].
All the models mentioned above are based on the idea of multi-objective optimization where one
leader decides which point on the Pareto-front is chosen. They all have one shortcoming; they do not
address the issues arising when different stakeholders/autonomous cities with possibly conflicting objec-35
tives toll the road. There is need for such models since autonomy of states/cities or regions are increasing
becoming popular in the area of infrastructure or road management. In literature, there are few works
dealing on these shortcomings: competition among stakeholders with privately owned network with in-
tention of maximizing their toll revenue is studied in [8, 9] - they formulated their problem as equilibrium
problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). Both toll and capacity competition among private asym-40
metric roads with congestion in a network with parallel links is studied in [10]. In their paper, [11]
analysed the allocative efficiency of private toll roads vis a vis free access and public toll road pricing
on a network with two parallel routes joining a common origin and destination. In one of their study
regimes, they considered a mixed duopoly with a private road competing with a public toll road. On the
other hand, tax competition on a parallel road network when different governments have tolling authority45
on the different links of the network is studied in [12].
The studies mentioned in the foregoing literature assume that network or road segments are privately
owned or managed by private stakeholders. They do not take into account that private stakeholders (with
likely contradicting objectives) that do not own networks influence the implementation of road pricing (or
nature of tolls) during policy making. Again, users acceptability of road pricing was not discussed; users50
were modeled to have no say on the imposed tolls. Campaigns on the implementation of road pricing
have failed in many cities like Edinburgh (in 2002), Trondheim (in 2005), New York (in 2008), Hong
Kong (in 1986), cities in the Netherlands, due to lack of support. This lack of support is due to the fact
that the debate on the implementation involves stakeholders with conflicting interests, moreover users
are most times never considered on the same level as these stakeholders. In this paper, we address these55
issues and formulate a general model that allows each stakeholder (including users) partake in toll setting.
In our models, the tolls are used to maximize stakeholder’s or system’s social welfare and not as a way of
generating revenue. We assume that the tolls are returned back into the transportation system so as not to
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increase the societal cost. Users are modeled on the same level as the stakeholders with one stakeholder
representing users’ interest.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives the basic traffic model for our road pricing
problem and extend the usual single leader single-objective road pricing to single leader multi-objective
road pricing. Section 3 then extends the single leader to multi-leader multi-objective road pricing using5
game theoretical approach; introducing the concept of Nash equilibrium for the road pricing game. In
section 4, we introduce the optimal Nash inducing mechanism which ensures that Nash equilibrium exists,
and that it coincides with system optimum. We demonstrate the models using numerical examples in
section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 BASIC TRAFFIC MODEL FOR ROAD PRICING10
2.1 Notations
Let G= (N,A) be a network, with N the set of all nodes and A the set of (directed) arcs or links in G. We
assume that travelers cannot overtake each other in G. We use the following notation:
A set of all arcs (links) in G a index for links in G
R set of all paths in G r index for paths (routes) in G
W set of all OD pairs in G w index for OD pairs in G
f path flow vector in G fr, flow on path r in G
v vector of link flows in G va flow on link a in G
d travel demand vector in G dw demand for the wthOD pair in G
Γ OD-path incident matrix in G Rw set of all paths connecting OD pair w in G
Λ arc-path incident matrix in G V set of feasible flow in G
D(λ ) vector of demand functions in G Dw(λw) demand function for the wthOD pair in G
B(d) inverse demand (or benefit) function Bw(dw) inverse demand function for the wthOD pair
λw least cost to transverse the wthOD pair t(v) vector of link travel time functions in G
e(v) vector of link emission functions in G i(v) vector of infrastructure-damage functions
s(v) vector of safety functions in G β monetary value of time per minute (VOT)
n(v) vector of link noise functions in G ρ ’average’ monetary cost of an injury crash
α vector of monetary value of emission per gramme depending on say urbanization
γ monetary equivalent of 1dB(A)defined for a certain noise level in G
K set of all actors in the road pricing game
Ck(v) total network cost function for the kthobjective in Gwith Ck(v) = ∑
aε A
Cak (va)
C vector of network cost functions in G
Z(v) total network cost in G. i.e. Z(v) = ∑
kεK
Ck(v)
15
2.2 Single Leader Problem Formulation
2.2.1 Stakeholder’s Problem
We summarize the “tolling problem” for elastic demand where each stakeholder k would like to solve as
if he were the unique leader. We assume that each stakeholder controls a unique objective, and he wishes
to maximize the user benefit and to minimize his own costs Ck(v) under user flow and environmental20
feasibility conditions. We have also assumed a uni-modal model. A multimodal model is straightforward
by adding a superscript on each flow related (dependent) entity, parameter and/or variable to indicate the
user class. By Beckmann’s formulation [13] the user benefit (UB) is given by
UB= ∑
wεW
dwˆ
0
Bw(ς)dς
where Bw(dw) is the inverse demand or benefit function for the OD pair wεW . Observe that UB = 0
when the demand is fixed.25
Assuming that UB is split equally among all stakeholders, the problem of stakeholder k can then be
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stated as follows :
SPk : min
v,d
Zk : =Ck(v)− 1|K| ∑wεW
dwˆ
0
Bw(ς)dς s.t.
v = Λ f ψ
Γ f = d λ
f ≥ 0 ρ
d ≥ 0 ϑ
(FeC−ED) (1)
g(v) ≤ 0 ξ }SideConstraints(SC)
Here, |K| denotes the number of stakeholders. The first set of constraints is the flow feasibility conditions
for elastic demand (FeC_ED); the first constraint states that the flow on a link is equal to the sum of
all path flows that passes through this link, the second equation states that the sum of flows on all paths
originating from origin node p and ending at destination node q for an OD pair pq equals the demand
for this OD pair, the third and fourth inequalities simply state that the path flows (and thus the link5
flows) and all OD demands are non-negative. We have also indicated the corresponding multipliers
(ψ, λ , ξ , ρ, ϑ) in the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions (see Eqn 1). The last constraint g(v) ≤ 0
(where g(v)εR|A|×|K|) contains possible side constraints on the link flow vector v. These side constraints
(which we assume to be convex or linear in v) may be standardization constraints such as:
The total emission on certain links should not exceed the stipulated emission standard.10
The total noise level on certain links should not exceed the standard allowed dB(A) level.
The number of cars on certain roads should not exceed certain numbers so as to preserve the pave-
ments and check accidents, etcetera.
Assumption 1: Throughout (and for easiness) we assume that the link cost (travel time) functions are
separable, that all functionsCak (va) in the objectiveCk(v) are strictly convex in va, that the inverse demand15
functions are separable and strictly monotonic, and that the side constraints g(v)≤ 0 are linear.
2.3 Multi-objective Model (MO)
In a standard MO model that considers all stakeholders, one has to solve [14, 15] a program such as:
min
v,d
Z = (SPt , SPe, SPn, SPs, SPi, ...) s.t. FeC−ED, SC (2)
Where the indices, (t,e,n,s, i, ...) refer to different objectives (see for example the table in section 2.1).
More precisely, one has to find a point on the Pareto front of this program. In what follows we will20
consider the Pareto point given as the minimizer of the (special) MO program (system monetary costs
Z = ∑
kεK
SPk):
MO : min
v,d
Z := ∑
kεK
Ck(v)− ∑
wεW
dwˆ
0
Bw(ς)dς s.t. FeC−ED, SC (3)
Note that by choosing different weight factors for the objectives in the MO, we can model preferences for
some externalities.
2.3.1 (Road) User Problem - UP25
Without loss of generality, we assume that the only determinant of user’s route choice behaviour is the
travel costs and benefits of a trip. Under Assumption 1, the well-known Beckmann’s formulation of
Wardrop’s user equilibrium (UE) [13] describes the users’ behaviour mathematically by the convex pro-
gram:
UP : min
v,d
∑
aε A
vaˆ
0
β ta(u)du− ∑
wεW
dwˆ
0
Bw(ς)dς s.t. FeC−ED
2.4 First and Second-best Pricing30
To solve the toll pricing problem in presence of one leader, first and second best pricing techniques are
mostly used. The first-best pricing idea is based on a comparison between the KKT-conditions for MO
and the KKT-conditions for UP. In general the first best prices are not unique. We summarize the result
in the following corollary (see [16] for proof, and [17] for a similar result).
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Corollary 1
Suppose (v¯, d¯) is a solution for the MO, then any social toll vector θ (with toll θa on link a) satisfying the
following set of linear conditions is a toll such that (v¯, d¯) is also the elastic user equilibrium with respect
to costs β t(v)+θ :
∑
aε A
(β ta(v¯a)+θa)δar ≥ B(d¯w) ∀r ε Rw,∀wεW
∑
aε A
(β ta(v¯a)+θa) v¯a = ∑
wεW
B(d¯w)d¯w
or in short
ΛT (β t(v¯)+θ)≥ ΓTB(d¯)
(β t(v¯)+θ)T v¯= B(d¯)T d¯ (4)
We will refer to Equation (4) as equilibrium constraint for elastic demand (EqC_ED). For fixed demand,5
the matrix form of Equation(4) becomes
ΛT (β t(v¯)+θ)≥ ΓTλ
(β t(v¯)+θ)T v¯= d¯Tλ
(5)
where λ is a free vector (of multipliers, see Eqn 1) with components λw representing the minimum route
travel cost for a given OD pair. One of the possible tolls is given by the “first pricing” toll (see [16, 17]
for proofs):
θsc = ∑
kεK
|K|∇Ck(v¯)−β t(v¯)+ |K|∇g(v¯)ξ (6)
If there are extra conditions on the toll vector θ (e.g., some links aεY are non-tollable (θa = 0)) there10
might be no feasible first-best pricing toll. In this case one has to find a second-best pricing vector, and
instead of solving a standard program MO one has to solve the following bi-level program also called a
mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC):
min
d,v,θ
Z =∑
k
Ck(v)− ∑
wεW
dwˆ
0
Bw(ς)dς s.t
ΛT (β t(v)+θ)≥ ΓTB(d)
(β t(v)+θ)T v= B(d)T d
θa = 0 ∀aεY
g(v)≤ 0
FeC_ED
(7)
3 MULTI-LEADER MODEL IN ROAD PRICING
In the foregoing models, we discussed a one leader road pricing problem using the MO program. Such15
models have their shortcomings; when one decision maker (dm), (e.g the government) controls the traffic
flow of a transportation system through road pricing, then it is likely that some other stakeholders affected
by activities of transportation may not be happy with the decisions made by this dm. This is because when
the dm models the MO road pricing problem, all traffic externalities are simultaneously considered with
or without preference for any externality (see MO Eqn 3). When preference is given, say, to congestion,20
then the effect of the preferred externality subdues the effect of other externalities, and this may translate
to huge costs for some stakeholders. For example, lower travel time (say high speeds) may translate to
more accidents (costs for insurance companies). Even without preference to any externality, it is intuitive
that stakeholders still will prefer to partake in toll setting to safeguard their interests. The main problem of
a classical approach from multi-objective optimization is the following: supposing that each stakeholder25
can influence the toll setting, why should a (independent) player accept a situation which he can improve
by changing the tolls?
In such a situation the classical concept of Nash equilibrium in game theory gives an appropriate
alternative model. Such models are accepted in economics in situations where independent players may
influence the market with their strategies in order to optimize their specific objective.30
The question we like to address from game theoretical/economic point of view is; What happens when
each stakeholder optimizes his objective by tolling the network, given that other stakeholders are doing
the same? Formally, we introduce the mathematical and economic theory behind.
3.1 Mathematical and Economic Theory
The MPEC (Eqn (7)) described in the previous section is a Stackelberg game where a leader (dm) moves35
first followed by sequential move of other players (road users). If we assume that various stakeholders are
allowed to set toll (or at least influence the tolls) on the network, then, users are influenced not only by just
one leader as in Stackelberg game, but by more than one decision maker. In a multi-leader-multi-follower
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game/problem, the leaders take decisions (search for toll vectors θ k, kεK, that optimize their respective
objectives) at the upper level which influence the followers (users) at the lower level. The followers
then react accordingly (user/Wardrop equilibrium), which in turn may cause the leaders to update their
individual decisions leading to lower level players reactions again. These updates continue until a stable
situation is reached. A stable state is reached if no stakeholder can improve his objective by unilaterally5
changing his toll. Note however, that given the stable state decision tolls of leaders, the lower level stable
situation is given by the (unique) Wardrop’s equilibrium. So the bi-level game can be seen as a single
(upper) level game with additional equilibrium conditions (for the lower level).
In the above scenario, each actor continuously solves an MPEC which is influenced by other actors’
MPECs, and this translates to an equilibrium problem subject to equilibrium constraints (EPEC). Since10
a stable state upper level tolls will lead to a (unique) Wardrop’s equilibrium in the lower level, our aim
therefore is to find a Nash toll vector for the leaders (see figure 1).
After settling on a Nash toll vector, users represented in the upper level search for an alternative but
lower toll vector using Equation (4).
Remark: The theory described above does not necessarily mean that stakeholders have different toll15
collecting machines on the links. Our model describes the Nash toll vector that can be agreed upon
during policy making or debate.
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FIGURE 1 Multi-Leader-Multi-Follower Nash/Cooperative Game Model
3.2 Mathematical Models for the Bi-level Nash Equilibrium Game (EPEC)20
We now mathematically introduce the toll pricing game and the concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) [18,
19] as outlined in subsection 3.1.
Assume that Assumption 1 holds. This in particular ensures that (for given costs) the Wardrop equilibrium
(WE) (v,d) is unique. Let θ k be the link toll vector of player k ∈ K. We use θ−k to denote all toll vectors
in K\k. In the Nash game, for given θ¯−k, the kth stakeholder tries to find a solution toll θ¯ k for the25
following problem:
Ψk(θ¯ k, θ¯−k) = min
θ k
Ψk(θ k, θ¯−k)
where for given θ k(and θ¯−k)
Ψk(θ k, θ¯−k) := min
vk,dkw
Zk =Ck(vk)− 1|K| ∑wεW
dkwˆ
0
Bw(ς)dς s.t
ΛT
(
β t(vk)+θ k+ ∑
j εK\k
θ¯ j
)
≥ ΓTB(dk)(
β t(vk)+θ k+ ∑
j εK\k
θ¯ j
)T
vk = B(dk)T (dk)
and
vk = Λ f k
Γ f k = dk
f k ≥ 0
(θ k ≥ 0)
(8)
The concept of a Nash equilibrium is to look for a situation where for fixed strategies θ¯−k of the opponent
players, the best that player k can do is to chose his own toll to be θ¯ k. A NE is thus a whole set of toll
vectors θ¯ = (θ¯ k,k ∈ K) such that for each player k the following holds:30
Ψk(θ¯ k, θ¯−k)≤Ψk(θ k, θ¯−k) for all feasible tolls θ kand ∀kεK (9)
See that in the optimization problem above, each leader k can only change his own link toll vector θ k.
The strategies θ¯ j, j 6= k of the other leaders are fixed in k′s problem. The left hand constraints are the
equilibrium constraints and the right ones are the feasibility conditions.
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3.3 Existence of Nash Equilibrium
In this subsection we analyse the existence of Nash equilibrium in our tolling game. We show below that
this simple standard Nash equilibrium concept (Eqns (8) & (9)) is not always applicable to the tolling
problem. The main reason lies in the special structure of the problems Ψk(θ¯ k, θ¯−k) in Equation (8)
leading to the following fact:5
Fact: Due to Assumption 1, for given vectors θ¯ k,k ∈K the corresponding solution (v¯, d¯) of the system (8)
(i.e., the elastic demand user equilibrium with respect to the costs
[
β t(v)+∑ j εK θ¯ j
]
) is uniquely given.
Therefore it holds:
If θ¯ is a Nash equilibrium, then all corresponding solution vectors (v¯k, d¯k) = (v¯, d¯), k ∈ Kof Ψkare identical.
(10)
Proof: Given that θ¯ k solves system (8) for all actors k ∈ K, then it means that at Nash equilibrium among
the actors, the link toll vector θ¯ is given by θ¯ = ∑
kεK
θ¯ k, where θ¯a = ∑
kεK
θ¯ ka , ∀a ∈ A. Due to Assumption 1,10
this toll vector θ¯ yields a unique flow pattern (v¯, d¯). Of course the users do not differentiate the tolls (per
actor k), what they experience is the total toll vector θ¯ , and as such, the vector θ¯ (together with the travel
time costs) determines the unique user/Wardrop equilibrium flow (v¯, d¯) for the system.
3.3.1 Unrestricted Toll Values
From the relation (10) we can directly deduce the following results.15
Corollary 2
(a) Suppose the leaders can toll all links with no restrictions (no constraint θ k ≥ 0 in (Eqn 8)), then,
for the tolling game with elastic demand, there does not exists a Nash equilibrium in general.
Moreover, in this game the players do not have any incentive to cooperate.
(b) When the demand is fixed, even under the extra conditions θ k ≥ 0 in Equation (8), there does not20
exist a Nash equilibrium in general.
Proof: We will even show that in (the general) case where not all players have the same solution (vk,dk)
in their own program SPk (see Eqn 1) there will never be a Nash equilibrium of the form in Equation (9).
(a) Assume θ¯ is a Nash equilibrium with (v¯, d¯, θ¯ k) the solution of player k. Recall that (by Eqn 10) all user
flows (v¯, d¯) are the same at Nash. By assumption, at least one of the players, say player `, has a different25
ideal (or optimal) link flow (v˜, d˜) in SPk (since players are assumed to have conflicting objectives) and by
our discussion in Section 2, player ` can achieve this flow in Ψl(θ˜ l , θ¯−l) by choosing e.g., the first best
pricing toll
θ˜ ` = |K|∇C`(v˜)−β t(v˜)− ∑
kεK\`
θ¯ k (11)
where |K| is the number of players. Note that this toll θ˜ ` may be negative. Since at any stage of the game,
any player k can always achieve his ideal flow in SPk,it is clear that no equilibrium can be reached and30
that players do not have any reason to cooperate if they can always achieve SPk on their own.
(b) The same clearly holds in the case of fixed demand. However, in this case we can always achieve a
first best pricing toll in Equation (5) satisfying θ˜ ` ≥ 0: To see this, note that for fixed demand, any leader
`εK has the following valid toll vectors as part of a whole polyhedron (see proof below) that achieve the
ideal flow vector for leader ` [20]35
θ˜ ` =
[
α
(
∇C`(v˜)
)−β t(v˜)]− ∑
kεK\`
θ¯ k; where α > 0 (12)
By making α large enough (in view of strict monotonicity) we can assure θ˜ ` ≥ 0.
Proof of (12): Suppose v˜ is an ideal flow vector that solves (1) (omitting the UB - fixed demand) for
player l, now let θ l be the corresponding toll vector satisfying (5), this means that v˜ is solution of the LP
min
v
(
β t(v˜)+θ l
)T v s.t. v ∈V
where β t(v) is a vector of link travel time functions. Obviously v˜ also solves the following LP
min
v
α
(
β t(v˜)+θ l
)T v s.t. v ∈V where α > 0
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but,
α
(
β t(v˜)+θ l
)T
v =
((
β t(v˜)+θ l
)
+(α−1)
(
β t(v˜)+θ l
))T
v
=
(
β t(v˜)+
[
θ l+(α−1)
(
β t(v˜)+θ l
)])T
v
this means that with θ l , any vector
θ˜ ` = θ l+(α−1)
(
β t(v˜)+θ l
)
= α
(
β t(v˜)+θ l
)
−β t(v˜)
is a valid toll vector as well. Recall that for fixed demand and for one objective, the marginal social cost
(MSC) toll or the so called first best toll given by (see Eqn (6) - elastic demand equivalent):
θ lsc = θ l = ∇Cl(v˜)−β t(v˜)
is one toll vector that achieves the ideal flow vector v˜, therefore5
θ˜ ` = α
(
β t(v˜)+θ l
)
−β t(v˜) = α (β t(v˜)+(∇Cl(v˜)−β t(v˜)))−β t(v˜)
= α (∇Cl(v˜))−β t(v˜)
In the presence of other actors’ toll ∑
kεK\`
θ¯ k, θ˜ ` now becomes
θ˜ ` = α (∇Cl(v˜))−β t(v˜)− ∑
kεK\`
θ¯ k; where α > 0 
We emphasize that extra restrictions on the tolls θ k may play in favor of the existence of a Nash equilib-
rium.
Generally, what can we say on the existence of NE? A well-known theorem in game theory [21] states10
that the game has a Nash equilibrium if the following conditions are met:
• The strategy sets for each player are compact and convex, and each player’s utility functionΨk(θ k, θ¯−k)
is continuous and quasi-convex in his strategy θ k.
However, in general we cannot expect such a convexity property. Even the mostly used “system opti-
mization” function is in general not convex as we will show by a simple illustrative example (See Braess15
network in subsection 5.1)
3.3.2 Compromise Between Nash and MO
Assume that we have a concrete multi-leader tolling problem such that a Nash equilibrium exists. Can
we find a "better" toll vector? Stakeholders can improve the system welfare (by solving a modified MO)
without deteriorating their individual utilities with reference to Nash outcome. On the other hand, if side20
payments are allowed, stakeholders will be better off cooperating or solving the MO. A possible model is
given below:
Given the actors Nash equilibrium flow pattern (v¯, d¯), the grand coalition game is given by (see MO
program - Eqn 3):
min
v,d
Z =
(
∑
kεK
Ck(v)− ∑
wεW
dw´
0
Bw(ς)dς
)
s.t
FeC_ED(
Ck(v)− 1|K| ∑
wεW
dw´
0
Bw(ς)dς
)
≤
(
Ck(v¯)− 1|K| ∑
wεW
d¯w´
0
Bw(ς)dς
)
∀kεK
The objective maximizes the system’s economic benefit. The first two constraints are as explained before,25
the third constraint makes sure that no actor is worse off than in the Nash outcome. As the Nash flow
pattern (v¯, d¯) is a feasible solution for the above problem, it is always profitable for the stakeholders
to agree on the solution (v,d) of the above program (see the case study). Note that given this solution
(v,d), a corresponding first best pricing toll has to be chosen to make this solution also to a UE. If extra
constraints on the tolls θ are present, then a second-best pricing approach can be used in the same way.30
Omitting the last constraint, we can use side payments to assure each player his Nash outcome, and even
more, additional benefits. This is always true since the total utility is optimal in the MO (Eqn 3).
TRB 2012 Annual Meeting Paper revised from original submittal.
A.E. Ohazulike, M.C.J. Bliemer, G. Still, E.C. van Berkum 9
4 OPTIMAL NASH INDUCING MECHANISM
We have shown so far that for the multi-leader model in Section 3, the existence of a NE cannot be
guaranteed. In this section we therefore design a mechanism which induces a NE and even more returns
the system optimal strategy as the optimal strategy for each actor. For this model we will assume that
there exists a "grand leader (GL)" who has authority over all other leaders (by adding one more uppermost5
level in Figure 1). Look at him as the central (or federal) government. His sole objective will be to ensure
(Pareto) optimal social welfare of the entire system. Since competition may lead to tolls that deteriorate
the social welfare, and since it is not clear if there is a profit sharing rule that leaves grand coalition as
the only stable coalition among the actors (the core of the game), we develop a mechanism that achieves
efficient and desirable global outcome irrespective of what the actors do. This mechanism aligns the10
objective of each actor with that of the GL. Thus, actors with once conflicting interests, now indirectly
pursue common (GL) interest. To achieve this goal, the mechanism uses taxing scheme to simultaneously
induce a pure NE and cooperative behaviour among actors, thus, yielding tolls that are optimal for the
system.
We assume that the total revenue generated from the taxing scheme just as the tolls (by the stakehold-15
ers) are invested back into the system. We also assume that the actors’ utility functions are known to the
GL. The tax can be seen as what an actor pays on the utility he enjoys for taking part in road pricing.
Note that for any solution v¯ of the models below, we can always choose a first-best pricing toll which
ensures that v¯ is UE .
4.1 Mathematical Formulation of the Mechanism20
4.1.1 Grand Leader’s Problem
Models described in this section will be on fixed demand d (the elastic case is straightforward).
The GL problem is a multi-objective (grand coalition) optimization problem that searches for a flow
pattern minimizing the entire system cost. The formulation is as follows (see Eqn 3):
min
v
Z(v) = ∑
kεK
Ck(v) s.t
v= Λ f ψ
Γ f = d λ
f ≥ 0 ρ
(13)
The constraints are the flow feasibility constraints and
{
ψεR|A|,λεR|W|,ρεR|R|
}
are the KKT multipli-25
ers associated with the constraints.
Let L be the Lagrangian and v¯ the solution to (13), then, there exists (ψ¯, λ¯ , ρ¯) such that the following
KKT optimality conditions hold:
L = ∑
kεK
Ck(v)+(Λ f − v)Tψ+(d−Γ f )Tλ − f Tρ
∇vL = ∑
kεK
∇Ck(v¯)− ψ¯ = 0 ⇒ ddva∑kεK
Cak (v¯a)− ψ¯a = 0 ∀aε A (14)
∇ f L = ΛT ψ¯−ΓT λ¯ − ρ¯ = 0 ⇒ ∑
aεA
ψ¯aδar− λ¯w− ρ¯r = 0 ∀r ε Rw, ∀wεW (15)
f T ρ¯ = 0, ρ¯ ≥ 0, ⇒ ρ¯r fr = 0 ∀r ε R (16)
Equation (16) is called complementarity equation.
4.1.2 Stakeholder’s (or Actor’s) Problem30
Having shown that NE does not exist in general, we discuss a mechanism where the GL chooses appro-
priate taxes xk, kεK that forces the game into a NE. The GL thus penalizes (taxes) kth actor by vT xk ,
where vT is the transpose vector of link flows and xk εR|A| is a leader specific constant vector.
Now for fixed tax xk each of the stakeholders kεK solves the following optimization problem:
min
v
Zk(v) =Ck(v)+ vT xk s.t
v= Λ f ψ
Γ f = d λ
f ≥ 0 ρ
(17)
Let L be the Lagrangian and v˜ the solution to (17), then, with (ψ,λ ,ρ), the following KKT conditions35
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hold:
L = Ck(v)+ vT xk+(Λ f − v)Tψ+(d−Γ f )Tλ +− f Tρ
∇vL = ∇Ck(v˜)+ xk−ψ = 0, ⇒ ddvaC
a
k (v˜a)+ x
k
a−ψa = 0 ∀aε A (18)
∇ f L = ΛTψ−ΓTλ −ρ = 0, ⇒ ∑
aεA
ψaδar−λw−ρr = 0 ∀r ε Rw, ∀wεW (19)
f Tρ = 0, ρ ≥ 0, ⇒ ρr fr ∀r ε R (20)
Observe that the only difference between the GL’s and the stakeholder’s KKT conditions is in Equations
(14) & (18). Now, the GL can choose taxes xk ∀kεK such that the actors optimal strategies coincide with
the optimal strategy v¯ of GL. To force Equation (18) to be exactly the same as Equation (14), i.e
∇Ck(v)|v=v˜+ xk−ψ = ∑
kεK
∇Ck(v)
∣∣∣∣∣
v=v¯
− ψ¯
xk = ∑
kεK
∇Ck(v)
∣∣∣∣∣
v=v¯
− ∇Ck(v)|v=v˜+ψ− ψ¯
we can take v˜= v¯ andψ = ψ¯ and choose the taxes
xk = ∑
lεK\k
∇Cl(v)
∣∣∣∣∣
v¯
(21)
Note that by the convexity assumptions on Ck(v), the solutions v¯ and v˜ of programs (13) and (17) are
unique.
• To summarize: by our construction, we have shown that if the GL chooses taxes xk ∀kεK as in5
(21) then the solution strategies v˜ of the all stakeholders in (17) coincide with GL solution v¯ in (13).
Remark: Observe from Equation (18) that a taxing scheme defined by the function vT xk with
xk = ψ¯− ∇Ck(v)|v=v¯ (22)
where ψ¯ is as defined in grand leader’s problem, is also an optimal Nash inducing scheme.
4.2 Flexible Taxing Scheme
Notice that the taxing mechanism above is analogous to first-best pricing tolling mechanism of the stake-10
holders on road users. So Equation (21) could be called first best pricing taxes. Thus, in the same way
as for the first best tolls in (5), there exist infinitely many values for xk in the taxing schemes vT xk(other
than Eqns 21 & 22) that induce optimal Nash. Using the KKT optimality conditions above, we first state
the following corollary
Corollary 3: If v˜ is the optimal flow vector in (17) for actor kεK, then, the following holds (the proof is15
analogous to one seen in [16, 17] for Wardrop’s equilibrium):
∑
aεA
(
d
dva
Cak (va)
∣∣∣∣
va=v˜a
+ xka
)
δar = λw+ρr ≥ λw ∀r ε Rw, ∀wεW
∑
aεA
(
d
dva
Cak (va)
∣∣∣∣
va=v˜a
+ xka
)
v˜a = ∑
aεA
λwdw
(23)
condensed to
ΛT
(
∇Ck(v)|v=v˜+ xk
)
≥ ΓTλ(
∇Ck(v)|v=v˜+ xk
)T
v˜= dTλ
for some λ ≥ 0 (24)
The first line of Equation (23) states that each leader kεK would want each road user to follow the route
that minimizes his (user’s) travel cost with respect to his (actor’s) objective function. The second line
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balances the network travel cost (w.r.t.k′s objective function) The following result on first-best taxes is
analogous to corollary 1.
Corollary 4: Suppose v¯ solves the GL’s problem (13), then, any taxing scheme vT xˇk such that xˇk satisfies
the following linear conditions is an optimal Nash inducing taxing scheme on leader kεK:
ΛT
(
∇Ck(v)|v=v¯+ xˇk
)
≥ ΓTλ(
∇Ck(v)|v=v¯+ xˇk
)T
v¯= dTλ
for some λ ≥ 0 (25)
5
Proof: The proof follows from Equation (24).
Remarks
1. Equations (21) & (22) directly satisfy condition (25).
2. With this flexible taxing scheme, the grand leader only needs to know the objective Ck(v) of actor
k to determine xk. This mechanism can be compared with the social (usual) taxing scheme where10
taxes depend on income. Also, any of the stakeholders can pull out of the road pricing scheme
without altering the model.
4.2.1 Secondary Objectives on the Taxing Scheme
Equation (25) suggests that we can set secondary objectives on these taxes. The following has intuitive
meaning:15
• Minimizing the total tax levied on each actor by solving the following linear system:
min
xk
v¯T xk s.t
ΛT
(
∇Ck(v¯)+ xk
)≥ ΓTλ ∀kεK(
∇Ck(v¯)+ xk
)T v¯= dTλ (26)
where v¯ is the GL desired link flow vector. Alternatively, for fairness, the GL may want to levy a
flat tax on all stakeholders e.g v¯T xk =M.
4.3 Coalition Among Leaders Under the Mechanism
A1: With the taxing scheme described, there does not exist a coalition in which any of the leaders is20
better off than in the induced Nash scenario.
Proof: Suppose such coalition exists, say with a feasible flow vector vˆ in which actor kεK is better off
than in the Nash scenario, then, it simply contradicts the already established fact that the induced Nash
flow vector v¯ 6= vˆ is the optimal (idle) flow vector for all leaders under the taxing scheme. Hence, such a
coalition does not exist.25
In fact, for an arbitrary coalition of two leaders k and m:
Let
C˜k(v) =Ck(v)+ vT xk
C˜m(v) =Cm(v)+ vT xm
where
xk = ∑
lεK\k
∇Cl(v)
∣∣∣∣∣
v=v¯
, xm = ∑
lεK\m
∇Cl(v)
∣∣∣∣∣
v=v¯
as given in Equation (21) and v¯ is the GL solution (see (13)). After coalition, their objective function is
C˜k(v)+C˜m(v) = Ck(v)+Cm(v)+ vT (xk+ xm) (27)
Given that v˜εV minimizes Equation (27), then, KKT conditions for the minimization problem differs
from those of stakeholder’s problem (Eqn 17) only in ∇vL which is given by:
∇vL= ∇Ck(v)|v=v˜+ ∇Cm(v)|v=v˜+ ∑
lεK\k
∇Cl(v)
∣∣∣∣∣
v=v¯
+ ∑
lεK\m
∇Cl(v)
∣∣∣∣∣
v=v¯
−ψ = 0 (28)
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Where v¯ is the GL’s optimal flow pattern. Since ψ¯ exists for the GL’s problem, then with ψ = 2ψ¯ , see
that v˜= v¯ is a feasible solution for Equation (28), and hence optimal (see Eqn 14). Therefore, for v˜= v¯,
Equation (28) becomes
2
(
∑
lεK
∇Cl(v)
∣∣∣∣∣
v=v¯
)
−2ψ¯ = 0 (29)
In the taxing scheme described above, we assumed that we can toll all links without bounds. This is5
the so called first best pricing scheme. In then next sections, we discuss the taxing mechanism with toll
constraints/bounds. When tolls are not allowed on some links (second best pricing scheme), we face even
a harder problem.
4.4 Optimal Nash Inducing Scheme for Second Best Pricing
4.4.1 Unbounded Tolls10
Here, we will see that the taxing scheme is also applicable when extra conditions on tolls are present and
the first-best tolls are no longer feasible.
4.4.2 Grand Leader’s Problem
Suppose, we have the toll constraints θa ≥ 0∀aε A, θa = 0 ∀aεY , where Y ⊆ A. We reformulate system
(13) as a bi-level optimization problem MPEC (see Eqn 4):15
min
v,θ ,λ
∑
kεK
Ck(v) s.t
ΛT (β t(v)+θ) ≥ ΓTλ
(β t(v)+θ)T v = d∗Tλ
θa ≥ 0 ∀aε A
θa = 0 ∀aεY
λ ≥ 0
vεV
(30)
The objective minimizes the system cost. The first two constraints are the user equilibrium conditions,
and the last three contain the toll and the flow feasibility conditions (see Eqn 1).
4.4.3 Stakeholder’s Problem
Each actor kεK, instead of Eqn 17, now solves the following MPEC (see system 8):
min
v,θ k,λ
Zk(v) =Ck(v)+ vT xk s.t
ΛT
[
β t(v)+
(
θ k+∑l εK\k θ¯ l
)] ≥ ΓTλ[
β t(v)+
(
θ k+∑l εK\k θ¯ l
)]T v = d∗Tλ
θ ka ≥ 0 ∀aε A
θ ka = 0 ∀aεY
λ ≥ 0
vεV
(31)
If we compare the KKT conditions of systems (30) and (31), then as in subsection 4.1, we have the20
following:
• let v¯ be the solution of program (30), then, if the GL chooses taxes xk as in (21), then the v¯ is also
optimal for all stakeholders problem (31).
In fact, there is no problem arising from the extra conditions on tolls since system (31) holds for all kεK
, and this means that ∑kεK θ ka = 0, ∀aεY . Since ∑kεK θ ka = θa ∀aε A, it then means that system (31)25
satisfies/captures the toll constraint in the GL’s problem (30).
Remarks
1. The GL’s estimated link toll vector θ¯ is a valid Nash toll vector for the actors (recall the optimal
Nash inducing scheme). One possible optimal toll vector for the actors is θ¯ k = θ¯ and θ¯ l = 0
∀l εK\k assuming that actor k makes the first move (i.e. actor k is player 1). These links tolls are30
not unique in general, but, a Nash toll vector θ¯ k ∀kεK is optimal for the actors if the cumulative
toll ∑kεK θ¯ ka = θa ∀aε A solves the GL’s problem (30).
TRB 2012 Annual Meeting Paper revised from original submittal.
A.E. Ohazulike, M.C.J. Bliemer, G. Still, E.C. van Berkum 13
2. Also other constraints on the tolls can be considered, for example, upper bounds θa ≤ φa ∀aε A;
with φa εR+. In this case, and for equity reasons, we have to assume each stakeholder has the link
toll bound: φ ka =
φa
|K| .
General Remark
The optimal inducing mechanism can also be used to check the (selfish) behaviour of:5
1. malicious nodes in car to car communication where cars exchange data/information within a limited
time frame.
2. local authorities tolling separate regions of the network.
3. energy producers in the energy markets liberalization problem.
4. agents in the principal-agents model.10
5. Internet providers in the providers-subscribers Internet price setting problem.
6. employees that have flexibility on the number of workdays.
5 NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
5.1 The Braess Network
We use a well known example to show that even the total network travel time (objective), in general,15
may not be convex in the tolls (strategy set). Such a draw back is enough to ruin the existence of Nash
equilibrium in the road pricing game [21]. The yellow label is the unique link identity, numbering the
links from 1 to 5. The other label is the cost a user encounter on using the link (v2 for link 2 and v4−0.5v24
for link 4, for example). The fixed demand from node a to d is 1. θi ∈ [0,1] represents the toll on link
i where θi = 0, for i 6= 1,3. For two classes of tolls, namely; θ3 ≤ θ1 and θ3 ≥ θ1 we have derived the20
following user equilibrated flows vi on the links:
3
for θ3 ≤ θ1
25
if θ3 ≤ 0.5, then v1 = v5 = 0, v2 = v3 = v4 = 1
if θ3 ≥ 0.5, then v1 = 0, v2 = 1, v3 = v4 = 1− (1+2(θ3−1))1/2, v5 = (1+2(θ3−1))1/2.
for θ3 ≥ θ1
30
if θ3 ≤ 0.5, then v1 = (θ3−θ1), v2 = v3 = 1− (θ3−θ1), v4 = 1, v5 = 0
if θ3 ≥ 0.5
v1 =
{
(θ3−θ1) i f (θ3−θ1)≤ 1− (1+2(θ3−1))1/2
2−2(0.5+0.5θ1)1/2 otherwise
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v2 =
{
1− (θ3−θ1) i f (θ3−θ1)≤ 1− (1+2(θ3−1))1/2
2(0.5+0.5θ1)1/2−1 otherwise
v3 =
{
1− (1+2(θ3−1))1/2− (θ3−θ1) i f (θ3−θ1)≤ 1− (1+2(θ3−1))1/2
0 otherwise
5
v4 =
{
1− (1+2(θ3−1))1/2 i f (θ3−θ1)≤ 1− (1+2(θ3−1))1/2
2−2(0.5+0.5θ1)1/2 otherwise
v5 =
{
(1+2(θ3−1))1/2 i f (θ3−θ1)≤ 1− (1+2(θ3−1))1/2
2(0.5+0.5θ1)1/2−1 otherwise
The system travel time function vT t(v) for θ3 ≥ θ1∩θ3 ≥ 0.5∩ (θ3−θ1)≤ 1− (1+2(θ3−1))1/2 is10
given by:
vT t(θ) = 1.5−(θ3−θ1)+(θ3−θ1)2+0.5(1+2(θ3−1))1/2−0.5(1+2(θ3−1))+0.5(1+2(θ3−1))3/2.
Note that we follow the traditional way of modelling travel time function in which the tolls are not
optimized in vT t(v), so, for example, the travel time for the object vT t(v) on link 1 is v1(1+0) = v1, and
that of link 3 is v3(0) = 0. θ1 and θ3 are set to zero since we assume that the tolls are returned back into15
the transportation system so as not to increase costs.
The Hessian of the travel time (TT) function vT t(θ) is given by
HTT =
 2 −2
−2 2+ 32 (1+2(θ3−1))−(1/2)− 12 (1+2(θ3−1))−(3/2)

See that the major determinant of this matrix is negative if θ3 ∈
( 1
2 ,
2
3
)
, thus, we can conclude that the
travel time function vT t(v) is in general not convex in the strategy set {θ1,θ3}. Suppose a stakeholder’s20
objective is to minimize the network travel time vT t(v), then in general, Nash equilibrium may not exist
since vT t(v) is not convex in {θ1,θ3}. This is also true even when other players’ objectives are convex in
their strategy sets [21].
5.2 Five-Node Network Example
5.2.1 Link Attributes and Input25
We will use a five-node network to illustrate the models developed in this paper. We demonstrate first-best
pricing scheme. For the second-best scheme we only need additional toll constraints.
1
c
a
e
d
b
3
4
5
6
8
2
7
The Five-Node Network
FIGURE 2 The Five-Node Network with Eight Links (1,2,..,8)
Emission factors are from the CAR-model [22], emission and injury costs are chosen in a reasonable way30
(see below), and noise costs are from [23]. The value of time (VOT) used is from [24]. An optimization
software AIMMS is used to solve the programs. All objectives include the user time cost t(v) as part of
their social cost since users always perceive this cost in the lower level.We have used the following cost
functions:
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System Travel Time Cost: Ct(v) = ∑
aε A
βvata(va) = ∑
aε A
βvaT f fa
(
1+η
(
va
Cˆa
)φ)
;
the so called Bureau for Public Roads (BPR) function, where
T f fa - free flow travel time on link a,
va - total flow on link a,
Cˆa - practical capacity of link a,and5
η and φ - BPR scaling parameters.
We will use η = 0.15, φ = 4 and β (value of time - VOT) = C0.1671667/minute, see table 1a for other
parameters.
Emission Cost: Ce(v) = ∑
aε A
ea(va) = ∑
aε A
va (αaκala+β ta(va)) ; where
κa - emission factor for link a (depending on the emission type and the vehicle speed on linka in g/vehicle-10
kilometre).
la - length of link a. In this case study, we only consider two emission types; NOx and PM10.
See table 1c for the emission factor κa and 1a for the emission costs αa.
Noise Cost: Cn(v) = ∑
aε A
na(va) = ∑
aε A
γ
[
A+B log(υaυ0 )+10log(
va
υa )
]
ha+ vaβ ta(va); where
AandB in dB(A) - vehicle specific constants as given in [25].15
υa andυ0(vre f ) - the average and reference speed of vehicles on link a respectively.
ha - number of households along link a.
We will use A = 69.4dB(A), B = 27.6dB(A) and υ0(vre f ) = 80km/hr, see table 1a for ha and 1b for the
monetary conversion parameter γ .
Infrastructure (Pavement) Cost: Ci(v) = ∑
aε A
ia(va) = ∑
aε A
va
(
τa(HaJa )la+β ta(va)
)
; where20
τa - load equivalence factor (LEF) that measures the amount of pavement deterioration produced by each
vehicle on link a.
Ha - initial cost for the infrastructure per kilometre.
Ja - design standard of link a measured by the design number of equivalent axle load (ESAL) repetitions.
Ha
Ja
- unit investment cost per ESAL-kilometre. The higher the design standard of an infrastructure, the25
smaller the factor (HaJa ), meaning that infrastructure with a high design standard are the most cost-effective
way to handle high traffic volumes [26].
We will use HaJa = 1. τa is given in table 1a as cost of damage to infrastructure/link in C/vehicle-kilometre.
Safety Cost: Cs(v) = ∑
aε A
sa(va) = ∑
aε A
ρτaEa+ vata(va) = ∑
aε A
va (ρτala+β ta(va)) ; where
τa - risk factor for link a, measured in number of injury crashes/vehicle-kilometre.30
Ea = la ∗ va - measure of level of exposure on link a.
We will set cost of one injury ρ = C300/in jury.
Recall that the parameters (β ,α,γ,ρ) are the monetary conversion parameters described earlier in section
2.1.
TABLE 1 Network Attributes35
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We define the following inverse demand (benefit) function for the OD pair w= (a− e):
B(dw) = 800− dw2 (32)
where dw is the variable OD demand for the wth OD.
5.2.2 Results
Table 2 below shows the ideal link, path flows and the objective welfare when various objectives are
singly optimized (as in Eqn 1) and in an aggregated multi-objective - MO (as in Eqn (33)) form. Of5
course this ideal link flows will never be achieved in practice (assuming an actor controls one objective)
since the objectives are conflicting. In the table, UE displays the Wardropian equilibrium on a toll free
network. Table 2b corresponds to the (non-unique) path flows as a result of table 2a. Table 2c (see the last
column) displays the effect of single objective optimization on the system welfare and other objectives.
The table displays how single objective optimization can adversely affect other objectives (see negative10
entries) and the system. The social welfare is maximal when the objectives are optimized in an aggregated
form (see Eqn(3)). The ideal welfare (bold diagonal entries) remain Pareto optimal for single objective
optimizations and MO. The system/social welfare(SW) or economic benefit is defined as in Equations (3)
& (33).
SW = ∑
wεW
dwˆ
0
Bw(ς)dς − ∑
aε A
(
βvata(va)+αavaκala+ γ
[
A+B log(
υa
υ0
)+10log(
va
υa
)
]
ha+ τava(
Ha
Ja
)la+ρvaτala
)
(33)
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TABLE 2 Link Flows, Path Flows and Welfare Results
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The objective values in welfare table is derived from the input functions for those objectives (see also Eqn
(1)).
5.3 Cooperative and Non-cooperative Leaders’ Game20
For clarity, we will only consider three actors whose interests are respectively to maximize the societal
welfare (Eqn 33) considering only system travel time cost, emission cost and safety cost respectively. We
will denote these actors by "t", "e" and "s" respectively. We assume non-negative link tolls.
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5.3.1 The Cooperative Game
For comparison reasons, we have shown the result of a cooperative game among the three actors (see
table 3a). They now solve the multi-objective models of Equation (3) using (33) (aggregating the three
costs). Recall that taxing scheme described will also lead to this cooperative outcome.
5.3.2 One Shot Game5
Here, without any knowledge of other actors’ toll vectors, the actors set tolls in one shot to optimize their
individual objectives (see Eqn 1). Each actor sets his ideal toll that would lead to his optimal flow in
single leader game.
The cumulative link toll vector resulted (see Table 3b) in a welfare of C177,350 which is 44% less
than cooperative outcome C316,674 of the same game. This reveals that the societal welfare from actions10
of uncoordinated actors can leave the network or the market far from optimal. The utilities of the players
are as a result of the cumulative link tolls. See table 2c for an idea of what the utility of a player would
be if only this actor operates without other actors. Note that the tolls in table 3 are in general not unique.
TABLE 3 Results for Different Kinds of Game Models Studied: First-Best Pricing15
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5.3.3 Nash Equilibrium Game
Here actors iteratively solve their individual MPECs (system 8). The game terminates (NE) when no
actor can increase his objective by changing his current toll vector given that other leaders’ strategies are
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fixed.
We solve the Nash game using the NIRA-3 [27]. NIRA-3 is a MATLAB package that uses the
Nikaido-Isoda function and relaxation algorithm to find unique Nash equilibria in infinite games. Condi-
tions on tolls ensure the existence of Nash equilibrium. For more on the NIRA-3 see [27].
Using alphamethod = 0.5, precision = [1e− 3,1e− 3], and TolCon = TolFun = TolX = 1e− 3,5
Linktoll bound f or eachactor = [0, ∞)EUR it took NIRA-3 approximately 2 minutes in 70 iterations to
find the NE (see Table 3).
The Nash game (table 3c) shows some improvements of C129,561 (73%) on the social welfare with
regard to the one-shot game. Iterative process of the Nash game tends to inform actors about other actors’
objectives, leading to a sort of coordinated game. In some limited sense, actors, during the iterative10
process, indirectly solve a multi-objective problem [28, 29]. See also that the cooperative game improves
the social welfare of this game by C9,763 (3%).
5.3.4 Users Interest
Users interests in the upper level (see figure 1) may be in form of an alternative (lower) toll vector that
achieves the same Nash flow pattern for the stakeholders. For the game with fixed demand, there may15
exist a lower toll vector for the same Nash flow. For elastic demand, users can gain much in toll reduction
by slightly deteriorating the actors utilities, because for elastic demand, the total toll revenue is the same
for all toll patterns [17]. This slight deterioration is easily covered by the gain in toll reduction so that the
actors are not left worse off than in Nash game.
In the Nash game of table 3c, users can ask for 22% (C68,164) deterioration of the total actors’ utility20
for a whooping reduction of 73% (C220,000) in the toll ’burden’ (total toll revenue). See in Table 3d that
the utility of player "t" appreciates while those of "e" and "s" depreciate under this new scheme. The users
offset the C68,164 loss in the actors’ utility from the C220,000 gain in toll reduction; guaranteeing each
actor the Nash outcome and possibly increasing their utilities by some ε > 0 for stability reasons. Notice
the "user friendly" link toll (total) pattern as compared to the previous games. The following formulation25
can be used for this problem:
max(theactors′ total utility− theactors′ total utilitywithrespect toNash)
s.t− thetotal toll reduction(gain)≥ C220,000
-thetotal toll gain≥ thetotal utilitygap
-theequilibrium(Equation4)and f easibilityconditions(Equation1)30
5.3.5 Compromise Between Nash and MO
See from table 3 that each stakeholder is better off in the cooperative game than in the Nash game. This
is a coincidence for this concrete example. What is generally true is that, the total utility for all actors
is always bigger in the cooperative game than in the Nash game, see table 4 for example. So, for side
payment games, there is always a payment scheme (e.g Egalitarian rule that distributes excess (w.r.t.35
Nash) utility ) that induces grand coalition among players.
5.3.6 Non-Existence of Nash Equilibrium
In this part, we demonstrate the non-existence of NE with unbounded tolls (subsection 3.3). We illustrate
with concrete example the result of corollary 2. Suppose actors toll the network in a sequential manner
("t" ==> "e" ==> "s" ==> "t" ==> "e" ==> "s"... and so on), we will show that they will always achieve40
their ideal flow (and hence their optimal objective value) in each move (see proof of corollary 2). Let us
represent the stakeholders’ action by θ ki which is the toll vector of actor k in the ith move. We also denote
by θ¯ k the ideal toll vector for actor k (see one-shot game of Table 3b).
Let player "t" be the first to toll the network, he thus uses his ideal link toll vector
θ t1 = θ¯
t = (17.99, 18.56, 18.98, 0.00, 0.00, 18.98, 18.80, 18.08)T
then for player "e" to achieve his ideal flow, he will now toll (see Eqn 11)45
θ e1 = θ¯
e−θ t1 = (161,09, 160,99, 161,65, 0.00, 0.00, 161,65, 160,42, 161,67)T
the next move will be player "s", and to achieve his ideal flow vector, his action is as follows:
θ s1 = θ¯
s− (θ e1 +θ t1)= (−72,35,−66,99,−78,14, 0.00, 58,45,−68,07,−73,28,−67,18)T
the next will be player "t" again, his ideal flow now is achieved by the following toll vector, and so on
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Tolls
Links θ t2 θ
e
2 θ
s
2 θ
t
3 θ
e
3 θ
s
3 ...
θ¯ t − (θ e1 +θ s1) θ¯ e− (θ s1 +θ t2) θ¯ s− (θ t2+θ e2 ) θ¯ t − (θ e2 +θ s2) θ¯ e−
(
θ s2 +θ
t
3
)
θ¯ s− (θ t3+θ e3)
1 −70,75 322,18 −144,71 −159,48 483,26 −217,06
2 −75,44 321,98 −133,97 −169,45 482,97 −200,96
3 −64,53 323,31 −156,28 −148,05 484,96 −234,42
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 −58,45 0.00 116,90 −116,90 0.00 175,35
6 −74,61 323,31 −136,14 −168,19 484,96 −204,21
7 −68,34 320,83 −146,56 −155,48 481,25 −219,83
8 −76,40 323,33 −134,37 −170,89 485,00 −201,55
illustrating our statement that Nash equilibrium does not exist with unbounded tolls. The same argument
holds for fixed demand even with non-negative toll restriction (corollary 2).
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE RESEARCH5
6.1 Contributions and Conclusion
We presented a game theoretical approach to solve the multi-objective road pricing including externalities
other than congestion. Due to political and equity reasons, various stakeholders and/or regions may
partake in toll setting. Since stakeholders may have objectives that do not align with each other, we
studied in this paper, the existence of Nash equilibrium among these actors. We showed that in many10
practical settings, NE need not exist. We also represented the road users’ interest in the upper level and
showed by means of example that such an idea can lead to better acceptance of road pricing schemes.
Since actors cannot be forced to form the grand coalition, we developed a mechanism that simultaneously
induces a pure NE and cooperative behaviour among actors, thus, yielding optimal tolls for the system.
The cooperative result has many advantages which include: 1) it protects local citizens from the15
negative effects of other jurisdiction’s pricing policies, 2) it eliminates the finance externality which
reduces demand for local roads from non local residents and hurts profit. We also saw that the model
developed in this paper is applicable in many interesting instances.
6.2 Research Extensions and Recommendations
Since the models used in this paper centered around classical optimization formulations, the number20
of variables can grow uncontrollably large with large networks. This calls for an efficient optimization
heuristic algorithms for large networks. Since flat link charge alone as described in this paper may not
fully attribute an externality to a car, for example, emission costs, we will extend our models to a kilometer
charge, which will then take care of the (current) taxes on gasoline, diesel an petrol. Furthermore, a
working paper is extending the models of this paper to multimodal settings and time dependent models,25
and further investigating under which specific conditions a (unique) Nash equilibrium exists among non-
cooperative stakeholders.
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